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Abstract
The decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma is being heralded as the most important Indian law decision
of the last 100 years, as it affirmed the reservation boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek)
Reservation – an area long considered by many to be under Oklahoma’s jurisdiction. Yet,
following release of the Court’s decision, the outcry from the oil and gas industry was almost
instantaneous, as roughly twenty five percent of Oklahoma’s oil and gas well and sixty percent of
its oil refineries are impacted by the Court’s decision. Additionally, the territory affected by the
Court’s decision also includes pipelines crucial to the successful operation of the nationwide
Keystone XL pipeline. While the Court was clear that its holding was limited to criminal
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, the decision nonetheless has broader implications for
Indian country, including natural resource development and regulatory framework. Because the
oil and gas industry will now have to work with tribes and the federal government instead of
favorable state officials, industry officials decry the Court’s decision as being detrimental to the
industry. But what exactly will be the impact of the Court’s McGirt decision on the oil and gas
industry, and the natural resources development in Indian country more broadly? While the full
impacts of the Court’s decision are only beginning to unfold, this Article seeks to answer the
questions left hanging by the Court’s decision as they relate to traditional energy development.
This Article explores the future impacts of the McGirt decision on traditional energy
development. The second Part of the article summarizes the legal background that governs oil
and gas development in Indian country. Part three provides an in-depth analysis of McGirt—
first, describing its predecessor, Sharp v. Murphy, followed by an explanation of McGirt and its
holding. The article concludes by discussing future implications of McGirt, including what it
means for oil and gas development going forward as well as collateral effects. The article
constitutes an important scholarly contribution as it answers important questions left open after
the Court’s decision and explains how the Court’s decision has broader implications for Indian
country and natural resource development generally.
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I.

Introduction

The decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma 3 is being heralded as the most important Indian law
decision in the past 50 years, if not the century. In McGirt, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Tribal nation’s treaty rights in determining that a portion of Oklahoma remained part of the
Muskogee Creek reservation. While the Court was clear that its holding was limited to criminal
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, the decision nonetheless has broader implications for
Indian country, including natural resource development and regulatory framework.
Indian country includes approximately 56.2 million acres of trust lands 4 and holds an abundance
of mineral and energy resources. American Indian Tribes are the third-largest owners of mineral
resources in the United States. 5 Tribal lands contain approximately three to four percent of
known oil and gas reserves, about thirty percent of western coal reserves, and a third or more of
uranium deposits.6 More than ten percent of federal on-shore energy production occurs on Indian
lands.7 And, with approximately 15 million acres of energy resources yet to be developed,8
Indian country can continue to help meet the energy demands of Americans into the foreseeable
future.
However, Tribal communities have not always benefited from conventional energy development.
While in theory oil and gas royalty revenues should strengthen tribal economies, in the past,
Tribes have received below market rates. 9 Fossil fuel production enterprises have also been
connected to increased violence against Native women10 and environmental degradation. Indeed,
Tribes continue to face negative health implications from uranium mines long closed. 11
591 U.S. _____ (2020).
NANR Chapter 5.
5 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ch. 17.03 (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2012).
6 NANR, Chapter 5, Natural Resource Development.
7 NANR Chapter 5.
8 NANR Chapter 5.
9 Navajo Nation v. United States, Case No. 2006-5059 (fix citation format)
10 Cite to article or EIS for project.
11 https://apnews.com/334124280ace4b36beb6b8d58c328ae3 or cite to actual study?
3
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Nonetheless, the McGirt decision reinforces Tribal sovereignty and the ability of Tribes to not
only direct their own future, but to hold other actors accountable as well. Given the extensive
resources contained within Indian country, the McGirt decision has the potential to further
position American Indian Tribes as key players in energy development in the 21 st century.
This Article explores the future impacts of the McGirt decision on traditional energy
development. The second Part of the article summarizes the legal background that governs oil
and gas development in Indian country. Part three provides an in-depth analysis of McGirt—
first, describing its predecessor, Sharp v. Murphy, followed by an explanation of McGirt and its
holding. The article concludes by discussing future implications of McGirt, including what it
means for oil and gas development going forward as well as collateral effects.
II.

Resource Development in Indian Country

Natural resource development in Indian country occurs within the confines of Indian law. In
order to understand the potential implications of McGirt, this Part sets the stage by providing an
introduction to applicable Indian law principles and the regulatory framework in Indian country.
A. A Brief Exploration of Indian Law
Tribal sovereignty is at the heart of Indian law. Simply stated, Tribal sovereignty is the inherent
ability of Tribes to govern their members and territory. It “provides a backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.” 12 As sovereign nations, Tribes interact with
the federal government and states on a government-to-government basis. However, Tribal
sovereignty is not absolute. In a series of cases called the Marshall trilogy, the U.S. Supreme
Court set forth the basis for Tribal sovereignty, while also limiting its reach. The Court coined
Tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”13 “They are denominated domestic because they are
within the United States and dependent because they are subject to federal power.” 14 The result is
the creation of a trust relationship between Tribes and the United States. “This
relation [is] that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that
of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a
master.”15 Under the trust doctrine, the United States has a duty to act in good faith in its
dealings with Tribes, much like that of a trustee and beneficiary. 16
Jurisdiction in Indian country is a fluid concept that has continued to evolve since the Marshall
trilogy. In order to determine who has proper jurisdiction—the Tribe, state or federal
government—basic facts must be gathered regarding who is involved and where the event took
place. As an initial matter, Tribes generally cannot act outside of Indian country. Indian country
is statutorily defined as (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation; (b) all dependent
Indian communities; and (c) all Indian allotments.17 Reservations may be established by treaty,
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
14 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ch. 1 (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2012).
15 Worcester v. George, 31 U.S. 515, 555 (1832).
16 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (describing the Tribal-federal relationship as resembling “a
ward to his guardian”).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
12
13
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statute, executive order, or administrative proclamation. To qualify as a dependent Indian
community, the land must satisfy two requirements: (1) have been set aside by the federal
government “for the use of the Indians as Indian land,” and (2) be under federal
superintendence.18 Finally, Indian allotments are the result of the allotment era, during which the
federal government allotted lands—in trust or in fee— to individual Tribal members. The Indian
country footprint has changed over time, with reservation boundaries being the subject of
extensive litigation.19 However, determining the geographic boundaries of a reservation can be
critical to determining proper jurisdiction.
Tribes retained inherent authority to exercise civil and regulatory control over non-Indians in
Indian country. However, Tribal authority over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land located
within a reservation is limited. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the conditions required to
exercise such civil jurisdiction in Montana v. United States. First, Tribes “may regulate through
taxation, licensing, or other means the activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.”20 Second, a tribe may “exercise civil authority over the conduct of
nonmembers on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.”21
The extent of Tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been shaped by caselaw22 and continues to
be tested to this day.
B. Oil & Gas leasing in Indian Country
Many Tribes rely on natural resource development as a means of economic development. “In
2019, federal recognized Indian tribes . . . and individual Indian mineral owners received $1.1
billion in energy and mineral revenue—the largest source of revenue generated from natural
resources on trust lands.”23 In Indian country, resource development can occur in three ways: (1)
Tribes may develop their resources directly; (2) Tribes may assume administration of a federal
Indian program through contracts and self-governance compacts;24 and (3) non-Tribal entities
may enter into leases or other arrangements to develop the land. 25 Most development occurs
through the third option26 and will be discussed in more detail below.
As a practical matter, Tribal oil and gas interests are the product of treaty language and the
Allotment era. Tribes have sole authority for leasing mineral rights on tribal lands owned in fee.
Native Vill. of Venetie Trib. Gov't, 522 U.S at 520.
See e.g., Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997).
20 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
21 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
22 See e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001), Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997).
23 Congressional Research Service, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs): Approval Process and Selected
Issues for Congress (July 9, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46446.pdf.
24 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 19784, Public Law 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as
amended in 25 U.S.C.).
25 NANR Chapter 5 or other cite?
26 NANR Chapter 5 or The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, The State of Native
Nations: Conditions under U.S. Policies of Self-Determination, 4 (2008).
18
19
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The Department of the Interior, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, holds title to trust lands for
Tribes. Federal approval is generally required for leases with non-Indian entities on trust lands.
This requirement stems from the Nonintercourse Act, which prohibits the “purchase, grant, lease,
or other conveyance” of Indian lands without federal approval.27 Failure to obtain Secretarial
approval means that the subject agreements are void. 28 Once the lease has been approved, the
federal government continues to have a trust responsibility toward the Tribe and trust allottees. 29
Mineral rights are presumed to have passed to the Tribe when a reservation has been established,
unless specifically excluded. 30 In some cases, the mineral rights may be separated from the
surface rights, creating a split estate. In those instances, additional challenges may arise in
determining what materials are included within the mineral reservation and to what extent the
surface owner must accommodate the mineral owner. The surface owner generally must
accommodate the mineral owner. However, under the Accommodations Doctrine, the mineral
owner must show due regard for the interests of the surface owner and only occupy those
portions that are reasonably necessary to develop the mineral estate. 31 Dealing with split estates
in Indian Country may be particularly challenging when the surface interests contain sacred
religious or cultural sites.
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982
(IMDA), Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005 (ITEDSA), and
Indian Tribal Energy and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2017 (ITEDSA 2017) govern
oil and gas leasing of Indian lands. The IMLA sought to provide uniformity to leasing laws of
Indian lands and to ensure Indians received the greatest return from their property. 32 The IMLA
allowed Indian lands to be leased for an initial term of 10 years, and then continuing thereafter
subject to Tribal consent and Secretary approval.33 While leasing can be lucrative, producing
lease revenues for Tribes, there have been other casualties from leasing. “Some leases may bring
large numbers of non-Indians onto the reservation or may entice states to attempt to exercise
regulatory and taxing powers over reservations.” 34
The IMDA still sought to maximize the financial return for Tribes; but, it also sought to further
tribal self-governance.35 Subject to Secretary approval, Tribes were authorized to enter into
minerals agreements, including “any joint venture, operating, production sharing, service,
managerial, lease or other agreement.”36 As a result, Tribes are able to more meaningfully
participate in the decision-making process and directly engage in the negotiations. Beyond

Add citation.
See 25 C.F.R. Section 211.53 (a).
29 United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391,398 (1973).
30 United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
31 The Accommodations Doctrine has been developed through caselaw and is also known the “alternative means
doctrine” and “due-regard” approach.
32 25 U.S.C. § 396-(a)-(g); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 767 n.5 (1985).
33 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2009), 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2006).
34 Reid Peyton Chambers and Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands,
26 Stan. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (1974).
35 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108; S. Rep. No. 97-472, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
36 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
27
28

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680658

merely providing approval, upon request, the Secretary must also provide assistance to Tribes
during negotiations.37
The ITEDSA further expanded Tribal control over resource development and the leasing
process.38 Through Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs), Tribes may enter into leases
and business agreements. 39 While Secretary approval is required for TERAs, once approved, no
further approval is required for the specific lease or mineral agreement that follows. The
ITEDSA also includes provisions for scientific and technical assistance. Upon Tribal request, the
Secretary shall ensure the Tribe has “available scientific and technical information and expertise,
for use in the regulation, development, and management of energy resources of the Indian tribe
on Indian land.”40 While the ITEDSA paved the way for greater Tribal control, few Tribes
initiated the TERA process due to lack of capacity, uncertainty regarding the process, and
concerns about the costs to Tribes. 41 Ultimately, no Tribes succeeded in entering into a TERA
with the Secretary.
In December 2018, Congress enacted ITEDSA 2017 to address Tribal concerns and the
following year, the Department of Interior finalized amendments to its regulations. 42 ITEDSA
2017 amended the procedural requirements for TERAs, including the timeframe for processing a
TERA and funding agreements. Whether the amendments and regulations were sufficient to
remove barriers to development remains yet to be seen.
III.

Sharp v. Murphy, McGirt v. Oklahoma, and the Emerging Epilogue: A ThreePart Saga

Having provided a background in the law as it currently exists in relation to oil and gas and
natural resourced development in Indian country, this Part now examines the U.S. Supreme
Court cases that have the potential to disrupt the present scheme – Sharp v. Murphy and McGirt
v. Oklahoma. The Part presents a descriptive analysis of these cases so that the arguments made,
and the Court’s reasoning become clear. With the previous Part’s background in place and this
Part’s descriptive analysis, the following Part will demonstrate how these two cases potentially
might impact oil and gas and natural resource development in Oklahoma.
A. The Prequel: Sharp v. Murphy
The long and winding road leading to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma
actually begins with a previous case, Sharp v. Murphy.43 In Sharp v. Murphy, an Oklahoma
prisoner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Following his conviction,
he filed a writ of habeas corpus arguing that, because the murder occurred within the Muscogee
(Creek) Reservation, the state court did not have jurisdiction in the matter. The relevant question
25 U.S.C. § 2106.
25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506.
39 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)-(b).
40 25 U.S.C. § 3503.
41 Congressional Research Service, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERA) at 1.
42 P.L. 115-325.
43 Sharp v. Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. Jul. 9, 2020) (“The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit is affirmed for the reasons stated in McGirt v. Oklahoma, ante, p. ___.”)
37
38

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680658

of Indian law before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation had been
diminished or disestablished. The court held that the reservation had not been disestablished,
and, as a result, the federal government and not the state had jurisdiction over the crime. 44
Mr. Murphy is a citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. He was charged with murdering
another man. After his conviction in state court, Mr. Murphy raised the question of the status of
the land where the murder was allegedly committed. If the land in question was Indian country,
then the state would not have jurisdiction over the crime, as the Major Crimes Act would apply
giving the federal government jurisdiction. The court therefore focused on whether the land in
question was Indian country, or, in the alternative, if the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s reservation
had been disestablished and therefore the land in question was no longer Indian country.
As a starting point, the Tenth Circuit explained that the Major Crimes Act 45 applies to major
crimes, including murder, committed within Indian country. The Major Crimes Act makes
jurisdiction over such crimes concurrent between the federal government and tribe. Jurisdiction
does not depend on whether the victim is an Indian. Further, “all lands within the boundaries of
a reservation have Indian country status” for purposes of the Major Crimes Act.46 Accordingly,
if the murder occurred within the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation, then the
federal government, and not the state, would have jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.
The Tenth Circuit next focused on determining whether or not the land where the murder
occurred was within the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation. Only Congress can diminish or
disestablish an Indian reservation, so, in determining the status of the land, the court focused on
the actions and intent of Congress. Courts cannot lightly infer disestablishment or diminishment,
and, as a result, the presumption is against diminishment or disestablishment. The court looked
for clear and plain intent that Congress wanted to diminish or disestablish the Reservation. The
court applied the factors from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Solem v. Bartlett47 to
determine whether diminishment or disestablishment had occurred. Under Solem, courts
examine the relevant statutory text to see if diminishment or disestablishment occurred. Explicit
reference to cessation will indicate that Congress intended to diminish or disestablish the
reservation. The second factor requires courts to consider events surrounding passage of the
relevant congressional act. And, to a lesser extent, the third factor instructs courts to consider
relevant subsequent historical treatment, such as how Congress treated the land in question and
demographics of the area.48 Finally, courts must resolve any ambiguities in the favor of tribes.49
The Tenth Circuit then went on to apply the three Solem factors to the present case. The court
explained that, as to the first factor, there are no “magic” words of cessation. The court provided
extensive detail related to the history of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. As to the first factor, the
court concluded that “[t]he most important evidence – the statutory text – fails to reveal
disestablishment at step one. Instead, the relevant statutes contain language affirmatively
875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017).
18 U.S.C. §1153.
46 Murphy, 875 F.3d at 917.
47 465 U.S. 463 (1984)
48 Murphy, 875 F.3d at 920-21.
49 Id. at 921.
44
45
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recognizing the Creek Nation’s borders.”50 In terms of the second and third factors, the court
concludes that the evidence is “mixed” and does not clearly support or negate disestablishment
or diminishment. Accordingly, since ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of tribes, the court
concludes that there is no evidence to support a finding of diminishment or disestablishment. 51
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the evidence does not support a finding that the
reservation was diminished or disestablished, and, as a result, the state did not have jurisdiction
over the alleged crimes committed by Mr. Murphy.
The sole question presented in the petition for writ of certiorari from the Tenth Circuit’s decision
was “Whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian
Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. §
1151(a).”52 The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari from the Tenth
Circuit’s decision on May 21, 2018. 53 Because Justice Gorsuch sat on the Tenth Circuit at the
time of its earlier decision in the case, he took no part in the Court’s decision. Following the
Court’s grant of certiorari, the case took a series of unique twists. On September 24, 2018, the
U.S. Solicitor General filed a motion for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae. 54
On November 27, 2018, the Court heard oral argument in the case, but, on December 4, 2018, in
an unusual development the Court requested supplemental briefing on two questions:
(1) Whether any statute grants the state of Oklahoma jurisdiction over the
prosecution of crimes committed by Indians in the area within the 1866 territorial
boundaries of the Creek Nation, irrespective of the area’s reservation status. (2)
Whether there are circumstances in which land qualifies as an Indian reservation
but nonetheless does not meet the definition of Indian country as set forth in 18 U.
S. C. §1151(a).55
Supplemental briefs were filed by the parties, the United States, and the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation.56 In a highly unusual twist, the Court failed to reach a decision in the case and restored
the case to the Court’s calendar for rehearing on June 27, 2019.57 The Court never heard
rehearing in Sharp v. Murphy, as it instead accepted cert in McGirt.
B. The Saga Continues: McGirt v. Oklahoma
Id. at 937.
Id. at 954-66.
52 Royal v. Murphy, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
No. 17- (Feb. 6, 2018) , available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171107/34619/20180206172951133_17-__PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf.
53 SCOTUSBlog, Sharp v. Murphy, available at: https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sharp-v-murphy/ (last
accessed July 24, 2020).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
50
51

Id. Because Justice Gorsuch recused himself from decisions in the case, many have speculated that the Court’s
actions meant the Court was deadlocked, 4-4, on a decision in Sharp v. Murphy. See, e.g. Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court to Rule on Whether Much of Oklahoma Is an Indian Reservation, New York Times Dec. 13, 2019, available
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/us/supreme-court-oklahoma-indian-reservation.html
57
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On April 17, 2019, the Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis was filed from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals by Jimcy McGirt, a pro se
defendant.58 Jimcy McGirt was convicted of three sexual offenses by an Oklahoma State
Court.59 As in Sharp v. Murphy, Mr. McGirt consistently argued that the State of Oklahoma did
not have the authority to prosecute him because he is an enrolled citizen of the Seminole Nation
and the alleged crimes occurred within the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation. 60 This is because the
Major Crimes Act provides that, within “the Indian country,” “[a]ny Indian who commits”
certain enumerated offenses “against the person or property of another Indian or any other
person” “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” 61 Because state courts
generally do not have authority to try cases occurring within Indian country, McGirt argued that
the Oklahoma courts should not have authority to hear the charges against him as the crimes
occurred within Indian country – the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation. Because this case raised
essentially the same legal question as Sharp v. Murphy, one may assume that the Court opted to
grant certiorari in this case, a case where Justice Gorsuch did not have to recuse himself, rather
than rehear Sharp v. Murphy for a second time. But, regardless of the reason, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted to petition and motion on December 13, 2019, and oral argument was heard on
May 11, 2020.62 The Court released its decision on July 9, 2020, a 5-4 decision in favor of the
Petitioner and the majority opinion was authored by Justice Gorsuch.
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on question of whether the alleged crimes took place
within the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation and were therefore within Indian country. 63 To answer
this question, the Court had to delve into the Treaty With the Creeks, Arts. I, XIV, Mar. 24,
1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832 Treaty), as the 1832 Treaty established the boundaries of the
Muscogee (Creek) Reservation. Ultimately, the Court held that “Today we are asked whether
the land these treaties promised remains an Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal
law. Because Congress has not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word.” 64
In reaching this decision, the Court explained that
No one disputes that Mr. McGirt’s crimes were committed on lands described as
the Creek Reservation in an 1866 treaty and federal statute. But, in seeking to
defend the state-court judgment below, Oklahoma has put aside whatever

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-9526/102351/20190610161914806_00000010.pdf (last
accessed July 24, 2020).
59 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 2 (2020).
60 Id.
61 18 U. S. C. §1153(a).
62 SCOTUSBlog, McGirt v. Oklahoma, available at: https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcgirt-voklahoma/ (last accessed July 24, 2020).
63 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 2 (2020) (“the MCA defines the term to include, among other things, “all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.”
§1151(a).”).
64 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 1 (2020).
58
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procedural defenses it might have and asked us to confirm that the land once
given to the Creeks is no longer a reservation today. 65
The Court therefore starts its analysis from the boundaries created by the 1832 Treaty and then
works forward in time to determine if the reservation has been diminished or disestablished by
Congress. The Court detailed assurances made by the United States to the Creek Nation that the
land in question would remain theirs, and also cites to the 1833 Treaty that provided the land was
to be the “permanent home” to the Nation.66 Although the Treaties in question did not
specifically use the term “Reservation,” the Court explained that it had accepted similar language
as establishing Reservations in past decisions. 67 And, although subsequent congressional actions
diminished the size the Reservation, Congress did reaffirm its commitment to maintaining the
land for the Creek Nation.68 The Court therefore confirmed the founding and continuation of the
Muscogee (Creek) Reservation in the 19th Century.
The Court, however, went on to explain that the United States had broken its treaty promises to
the Nation and that the land had been broken up over subsequent years. And, as a result, many
non-Indians now owned land within the borders of the Reservation. 69 The Court provided the
following guidance in determining whether or not the Reservation still existed despite these
changes in ownership:
To determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reservation, there is only one
place we may look: the Acts of Congress. This Court long ago held that the
Legislature wields significant constitutional authority when it comes to tribal
relations, possessing even the authority to breach its own promises and treaties.
But that power, this Court has cautioned, belongs to Congress alone. Nor will this
Court lightly infer such a breach once Congress has established a reservation. 70
The Court affirmed that only Congress can diminish reservation boundaries, and the Court went
on to provide historical examples proving that Congress knows how to use language to diminish
or disestablish a reservation. 71 Oklahoma argued that Congress did exactly that to the Muscogee
(Creek) Reservation during the allotment era of the late 18th and early 19th Centuries when
Congress opened up tribal lands to allotment and settlement by non-Indians.72 The Court
responds to this argument, however, by explaining that “[m]issing in all this, however, is a
statute evincing anything like the “present and total surrender of all tribal interests” in the
affected lands.”73 In other words, although Congress opened up the Reservation to non-Indian
settlement and purchase of lands, there is no congressional act specifically specifying that
Congress intended to disestablish the Reservation.
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 3 (2020).
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 4 (2020).
67 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 5 (2020).
68 Id. at 5-6. The Court also noted that several subsequent federal laws made mention of the Creek Reservation.
69 Id. at 6.
70 Id. at 7 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 566–568 (1903); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 470
(1984)).
71 Id. at 8.
72 Id. at 8-9.
73 Id. at 9.
65
66
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Oklahoma argued that, even if the Reservation was not explicitly disestablished, Congress
intruded into the Nation’s ability to self-govern, such as banning tribal courts. As a result,
Oklahoma argued that Congress intended to disestablish the reservation. 74 The Court retorted by
explaining that:
But, just as plainly, they [Congress] left the Tribe with significant sovereign
functions over the lands in question. For example, the Creek Nation retained the
power to collect taxes, operate schools, legislate through tribal ordinances, and,
soon, oversee the federally mandated allotment process. And, in its own way, the
congressional incursion on tribal legislative processes only served to prove the
power: Congress would have had no need to subject tribal legislation to
Presidential review if the Tribe lacked any authority to legislate. Grave though
they were, these congressional intrusions on pre-existing treaty rights fell short of
eliminating all tribal interests in the land. 75
The Court also explained that the Five Civilized Tribes Act of 1906 did not disestablish the
Reservation or put an end to the tribal government, although the Act did result in significantly
more federal intrusion into the Nation’s activities.76 Also, the 1906 Act did affirm the Nation’s
continued existence, and subsequent congressional actions never suggested that the tribal
government ceased to exist. 77 Starting in the 1930s, the federal policies toward tribal
governments changed, and since that time, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation has only grown and
prospered.78
Given that Oklahoma could not point to any action of Congress that explicitly disestablished the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, it argued that historical practices and demographic data suggest that
the Reservation has been disestablished. 79 Oklahoma argued that the Court’s decision in Solem
v. Bartlett should be read as creating a three step test, requiring the court to go through all three
tests: 1) congressional statements; 2) contemporary events; and, 3) subsequent events and
demographics.80 But, the Court rejects this reading of Solem, explaining that
This is mistaken. When interpreting Congress’s work in this arena, no less than
any other, our charge is usually to ascertain and follow the original meaning of
the law before us. … That is the only “step” proper for a court of law. To be sure,
if during the course of our work an ambiguous statutory term or phrase emerges,
we will sometimes consult contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices to the
extent they shed light on the meaning of the language in question at the time of
enactment. … But Oklahoma does not point to any ambiguous language in any of
the relevant statutes that could plausibly be read as an Act of disestablishment.
Nor may a court favor contemporaneous or later practices instead of the laws
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 14-15.
77 Id. at 15.
78 Id. at 16.
79 Id. at 17.
80 Id. at 18.
74
75
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Congress passed. As Solem explained, “[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an
Indian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots
within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress
explicitly indicates otherwise.” 465 U. S., at 470 (citing United States v.
Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909)).81
Accordingly, the Court makes clear that there is no reason to consult external sources when the
congressional meaning is unambiguous. Given there is no ambiguity in any of the congressional
actions taken with regard to the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation, the Court does not need to
review subsequent events or demographic data. 82
In the alternative, Oklahoma argues that the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation was never
established in the first place. 83 Specifically, Oklahoma argues that all the Nation possessed was
a dependent Indian community, as a reservation was never explicitly created. 84 However, the
Court counters that, even accepting this argument at face value, dependent Indian communities
are part of Indian country.85 As a result, Oklahoma would lack jurisdiction to prosecute Mr.
McGirt regardless of whether the territory is a Reservation or a dependent Indian community, as
both qualify as Indian country.86 Oklahoma asserted that because the Nation owned the land in
fee, it could not be reservation land, which must be withheld by the federal government from
sale.87 The Court, however, rejected this argument because, even though the Nation held the
land in fee, the federal government did preclude it from being sold. 88
Oklahoma offers another argument in the alternative – that it does not matter whether or not the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation still exists, as the Major Crimes Act does not apply to the eastern
portion of Oklahoma.89 The State of Oklahoma was formed from two territories – the Oklahoma
territory of the west and the Indian territory of the east.90 As a result, the court structure in place
between the two territories differed. The Court rejected this argument, however, finding that the
Major Crimes Act applied to Oklahoma as soon as it became a state. 91
Finally, Oklahoma abandoned legal arguments, and focuses on policy arguments instead.
Oklahoma warns “our holding might be used by other tribes to vindicate similar treaty promises.
Ultimately, Oklahoma fears that perhaps as much as half its land and roughly 1.8 million of its
residents could wind up within Indian country.”92 But, the Court responds by explaining that it
can only focus on the Treaties currently before it and cannot speculate as to other tribes and
treaties. Further, the Court ponders
Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
Id. at 20.
83 Id. at 28.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 28-29.
86 Id. at 29.
87 Id. at 30.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 32.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 33.
92 Id. at 37.
81
82
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What are the consequences the State and dissent worry might follow from an
adverse ruling anyway? Primarily, they argue that recognizing the continued
existence of the Creek Reservation could unsettle an untold number of
convictions and frustrate the State’s ability to prosecute crimes in the future. But
the MCA applies only to certain crimes committed in Indian country by Indian
defendants.93
Oklahoma does assert that the Court’s decision in favor of affirming the existence of the
Muscogee (Creek) Reservation will have far reaching implications beyond application of the
Major Crimes Act. But, the Court responds in kind, explaining
Finally, the State worries that our decision will have significant consequences for
civil and regulatory law. The only question before us, however, concerns the
statutory definition of “Indian country” as it applies in federal criminal law under
the MCA, and often nothing requires other civil statutes or regulations to rely on
definitions found in the criminal law. Of course, many federal civil laws and
regulations do currently borrow from §1151 when defining the scope of Indian
country. But it is far from obvious why this collateral drafting choice should be
allowed to skew our interpretation of the MCA, or deny its promised benefits of a
federal criminal forum to tribal members. It isn’t even clear what the real upshot
of this borrowing into civil law may be. Oklahoma reports that recognizing the
existence of the Creek Reservation for purposes of the MCA might potentially
trigger a variety of federal civil statutes and rules, including ones making the
region eligible for assistance with homeland security, 6 U. S. C. §§601, 606,
historical preservation, 54 U. S. C. §302704, schools, 20 U. S. C. §1443,
highways, 23 U. S. C. §120, roads, §202, primary care clinics, 25 U. S. C.
§1616e–1, housing assistance, §4131, nutritional programs, 7 U. S. C. §§2012,
2013, disability programs, 20 U. S. C. §1411, and more. But what are we to make
of this? Some may find developments like these unwelcome, but from what we
are told others may celebrate them.94
The Court does go on to explain that, should such fears become a reality, other legal remedies
exist to protect established interests.
Still, we do not disregard the dissent’s concern for reliance interests. It only seems
to us that the concern is misplaced. Many other legal doctrines—procedural bars,
res judicata, statutes of repose, and laches, to name a few—are designed to protect
those who have reasonably labored under a mistaken understanding of the law.
And it is precisely because those doctrines exist that we are “fre[e] to say what we
know to be true . . . today, while leaving questions about . . . reliance interest[s]
for later proceedings crafted to account for them.” Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___
(plurality opinion) (slip op., at 24).95
Id.
Id. at 39-40.
95 Id. at 41.
93
94
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For these reasons, the Court reversed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in McGirt v.
Oklahoma, and, at the same time, affirmed the Tenth Circuit in Sharp v. Murphy.
C. The Epilogue (?) or The Known Unknown
The full impact of the McGirt decision is only just beginning to play out. In response to dire
warnings by the State of Oklahoma and the dissent in the case, Justice Gorsuch opined at the end
of the majority opinion that
With the passage of time, Oklahoma and its Tribes have proven they can work
successfully together as partners. Already, the State has negotiated hundreds of
intergovernmental agreements with tribes, including many with the Creek. See
Okla. Stat., Tit. 74, §1221 (2019 Cum. Supp.); Oklahoma Secretary of State,
Tribal Compacts and Agreements, www.sos.ok.gov/tribal.aspx. These agreements
relate to taxation, law enforcement, vehicle registration, hunting and fishing, and
countless other fine regulatory questions. … No one before us claims that the
spirit of good faith, “comity and cooperative sovereignty” behind these
agreements, … will be imperiled by an adverse decision for the State today any
more than it might be by a favorable one. 96
The majority therefore recognizes that the decision will have repercussions for the relationship
between the Muscogee (Creek) Nation (and potentially other Oklahoma Tribes) and the State of
Oklahoma, but believes that the relevant parties have the capacity to work through such
challenges in a spirit of “cooperative sovereignty.”
As predicted, the parties responded incredibly quickly, releasing a “Murphy/McGirt Agreementin-Principle” on July 16, 2020 – only one week after the Court released its decision. 97 For all
intents and purposes, the proposed Agreement-in-Principle, which was a mere two pages,
mirrored existing federal Indian law applicable to other parts of Indian country with regard to
tribal civil regulatory and adjudicatory authority.98 The same could not be said with regard to its
Id. at 41-42.
Oklahoma Attorney General, Attorney General and Five Tribes Release Agreement in Principle for Criminal.
Civil Jurisdiction (posted July 16, 2020); http://www.oag.ok.gov/attorney-general-and-five-tribes-releaseagreement-in-principle-for-criminal-civil-jurisdiction.
98 For example, the provision on civil regulatory/adjudicatory jurisdiction in Indian country largely mirrors the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is a general
presumption against tribal civil regulatory authority over non-Indians on non-Indian land, unless the non-Indian
consents to tribal jurisdiction or the actions of the non-Indian threaten the health, safety, and welfare of the Tribe.
450 U.S. 544 (1981); compare with Murphy/McGirt Agreement-in-Principle, 2, available at:
http://www.oag.ok.gov/Websites/oag/images/doc%20-%202020-07-15%20-%20murphy%20(final%20%20agreement-in-principle).pdf (last accessed July 25, 2020) (“Affirm the Five Tribes’ civil jurisdiction throughout
their respective treaty territories, to be exercised subject to Federal law that generally governs Tribal civil
jurisdiction in Indian country. The Five Tribes would accordingly be affirmed in their civil jurisdiction over, for
example, matters of self-government and their members but would remain subject to the Federal law that provides,
as a general matter, that Tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over non-members outside Indian trust or restricted
lands, as described above, except for (1) subject matters for which Federal law specifically grants Tribes
jurisdiction; (2) activities of non-members that are part of a consensual relationship, such as contracts, with the
96
97
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criminal provisions. The agreement was quickly criticized by many in Indian country, and
especially Oklahoma tribal members, as surrendering tribal sovereignty because the agreement
would allow the state to prosecute crimes that have traditionally been under the exclusive
sovereignty of the tribes or the federal government.99 Both the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and
Seminole Nation withdrew from the Agreement-in-Principle over concerns that the Agreementin-Principle would surrender aspects of tribal sovereignty that had been affirmed in the Court’s
decision.100 The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma’s position on the Agreement-in-Principle seems,
at the time of writing, to be influx, as the Principal Chief of the Nation originally signed on to the
agreement, but, after significant backlash from citizens of the Nation, seems to be open to
different courses of action.101 At best, it would seem that tribal support for the Agreement-inPrinciple is waning.
At the same time this is happening in Oklahoma between the State of Oklahoma and Tribes
located within Oklahoma, a rumor has emerged suggesting that some in Congress are working on
legislation that would terminate reservations in Oklahoma. 102 Given Congress has plenary
authority in Indian country,103 it certainly possesses the authority to disestablish reservations in
Oklahoma, as Justice Gorsuch hinted at in his opinion.104 But, given the political realities of
Congress at the moment, whether such congressional action would actually manifest as a reality
is a question mark.
The weeks following the Court’s decision in McGirt have been a roller coaster ride in terms of
tribal-state, state-federal, and tribal-federal relations for the parties involved. While the Court’s
decision answered the immediate question of the current status of the Muscogee (Creek)
Reservation’s boundaries, it opened many other questions that remain to be answered – some
answers will be easier to come by than others.
IV.

Status Quo Meets McGirt: How the Court’s Decision May Impact Natural
Resource Development in Oklahoma and Beyond

Tribe; or (3) conduct of non-members that threatens Tribal self-governance or the economic security, health, or
welfare of the Tribe.”).
99 See e.g. Zac Russell, Cherokee Nation Won’t Surrender its Sovereignty, Indianz.com (July 24, 2020);
https://www.indianz.com/News/2020/07/24/zac-russell-cherokee-nation-can-protect.asp.
100 Acee Agoyo, No 'surrender': Muscogee (Creek) Nation stands firm on sovereignty after historic Supreme Court
win, Indianz.com (July 20, 2020); available at: https://www.indianz.com/News/2020/07/20/no-surrender-muscogeecreek-nation-stand.asp.
Chad Hunter, Cherokee Nation leaders spar over McGirt ruling response, Cherokee Phoenix (July 22, 2020);
https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/index/145053.
101

Acee Agoyo, National Congress of American Indians stands strong against efforts to erode tribal sovereignty,
Indianz.com (July 23, 2020); available at: https://www.indianz.com/News/2020/07/23/national-congress-ofamerican-indians-st-1.asp?fbclid=IwAR1GlV11UMWj8n0U0KT0l7UCTVl4reFynQZEA0KwGiJ3_xur4ySXw_viGU.
103 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
104 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 42 (2020) (“And, of course, should agreement prove elusive, Congress
remains free to supplement its statutory directions about the lands in question at any time. It has no shortage of tools
at its disposal.”).
102
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With background on the existing law impacting natural resource development and an
understanding of what and why the Court ruled in McGirt, this Part now examines how the
Court’s decision will likely (not) impact natural resource development, including oil and gas
development, within the recognized reservation borders of the Tribes impacted by the Court’s
decision. There are a couple of things that the McGirt decision clearly does not effect, and so
these will not be discussed below. First, anyone who currently owns title in land within the
reaffirmed borders of the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation will not lose their property as a result of
this decision.105 It is not uncommon for non-Indians and non-Indian entities to own land within
tribal reservations. Similarly, taxes based on land ownership/status will likely not be affected by
this decision.106 This Part, however, will address those aspects of the status quo that may be
affected by the McGirt decision, such as: criminal jurisdiction, environmental regulation, some
taxes, oil and gas regulation, and rights of way. The Part ends with a section that speculates on
how the McGirt decision may impact other areas of federal Indian law, such as in the assertion of
tribal treaty rights, recognition of tribal sovereignty, and the federal government’s willingness to
recognize broken promises.
A.

Criminal Jurisdiction

As the above discussion of the drama that unfolded in the weeks following the McGirt decision
suggests, the many seem to be currently focused on the decision’s impact on criminal jurisdiction
within Indian country, as specifically the reservations impacted by the decision. 107 To
understand the potential impact of the decision, it is helpful to briefly review criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country. Exclusive tribal criminal authority began to fray in 1817, when
Congress passed the General Crimes Act which unilaterally imposed federal criminal jurisdiction
on crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. 108 The intrusion
continued with the passage of the Major Crimes Act (MCA) in 1885, which was the focus of the
Court’s analysis in the McGirt decision.109 The law unilaterally imposes federal criminal
Grant D. Crawford, Former tribal justice, law school dean says Supreme Court's McGirt ruling has no affect on
property ownership, taxation, CNHI LLC (July 18, 2020), https://www.cnhi.com/featured_stories/former-tribaljustice-law-school-dean-says-supreme-courts-mcgirt-ruling-has-no-affect-on/article_69a44cd6-c9be-11ea-ae3af753c26e583b.html (“Many concerns have been about the ownership of land, and taxation within the reservation.
Leeds said the ruling in no way affects ownership and title of land. ‘We're talking about reservation boundaries for
jurisdictional purposes," she said. "So all of these pieces of land that are already on the county tax rolls, those aren't
coming off. There's already federal legislation that says after the allotment – after restriction is lifted from those
lands – those lands become fully taxable.’”).
105

Grant D. Crawford, Former tribal justice, law school dean says Supreme Court's McGirt ruling has no affect on
property ownership, taxation, CNHI LLC (July 18, 2020), https://www.cnhi.com/featured_stories/former-tribaljustice-law-school-dean-says-supreme-courts-mcgirt-ruling-has-no-affect-on/article_69a44cd6-c9be-11ea-ae3af753c26e583b.html.
107 Although the decision was specific to the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation and the histories of the Tribes in
Eastern Oklahoma are different, many believe that the histories of the “Five Civilized Tribes” in the area are similar
enough that the McGirt decision will potentially impact the reservation boundaries of these other Tribes – such as
the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. See e.g. Grant D. Crawford, Former tribal justice, law school dean says
Supreme Court's McGirt ruling has no effect on property ownership, taxation, CNHI LLC (July 18, 2020),
https://www.cnhi.com/featured_stories/former-tribal-justice-law-school-dean-says-supreme-courts-mcgirt-rulinghas-no-affect-on/article_69a44cd6-c9be-11ea-ae3a-f753c26e583b.html.
108 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
109 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
106
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jurisdiction on crimes committed by Indians who are accused of felony-level crimes. While
tribal nations retain concurrent authority over such Indians, the imposition of the federal system
has served to complicate and confuse the direct application of justice to those who commit
violent acts.110
Tribal governments themselves are limited in the application of tribal criminal law. There are
two major restrictions on tribal criminal authority pertinent to the discussion of natural resource
development in Indian country. First, tribal governments are limited in the length of
incarceration and the imposition of fines as a result of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 111
Until the passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act (discussed below), the maximum penalties
that could be imposed by a tribal court were 1 year and/or a 5,000-dollar fine – for any crime,
including sexual assault and sex trafficking. 112
Perhaps more pertinent to the question of energy extraction is a prohibition on the application of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In the 1978 case Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, the Supreme Court stripped the authority of tribal nations to prosecute non-Indians – for
any crime.113 The Oliphant case involved the criminal actions of two non-Indians on the
Suquamish Indian reservation. 114 When the Suquamish tribe sought to prosecute the two nonIndians, they protested tribal jurisdiction, arguing that, as non-Indians, they should not be subject
to tribal jurisdiction (despite the fact that the crimes had been committed on the reservation). 115
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court ruled that tribal governments, by virtue of their dependence on
the federal government, had lost certain attributes of inherent sovereignty, including the authority
to prosecute non-Indians.116 As a result, only the federal government (or a state government
pursuant to special delegation) can prosecute non-Indians accused of a violent crime.
The federal government has released a variety of different crime reports which universally come
to the same conclusion – that Native people experience some of the highest rates of crime in the
Nation, and most of that crime is being committed by non-Indians.117 The 2016 federal report
concluded that over 80% of Native women will experience some form of violent crime in their
lives, and that over 56% of Native women will experience some form of sexual violence in their
lifetimes.118 The 2016 report also concluded that over 90% of Native people report that they have
been the victims of inter-racial violence – that is, a victim of a non-Indian perpetrator.119
Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal Indian Policy, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 200, 229 (2017) (noting that the blurred lines between tribal and federal authority produce complex
questions).
111 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
112 Id.
113 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
114 Id. at 194.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 199.
117 See, e.g. STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME:
A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002; PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN (2000); ANDRE ROSAY, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN
AND MEN (2016).
118 ANDRE ROSAY, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN (2016).
119 ANDRE ROSAY, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN (2016).
110
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This is relevant to natural resource development, because such development requires that
significant numbers of non-Native people move (at least temporarily) to the lands in or near
reservations to effectuate energy development through the development of pipeline or the
industry of fracking.120 Many studies have concluded that violence against Native women and
children increases when the exploitation of land brings large numbers of non-Native men to
tribal jurisdictions.121
Two major pieces of legislation were adopted to address these concerns – the Tribal Law and
Order Act (TLOA) of 2010122 and the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA).123 Both laws were intended to improve the response to violent crime in Indian country
by enhancing the federal response to crime while also lifting some of the restrictions on tribal
authority. VAWA 2013 was groundbreaking – for the first time since Oliphant, the federal
government authorized tribal nations to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians – but only in cases
of domestic violence. While spouses and dating partners can be prosecuted, non-Indians who
have not been in a relationship with their victims are still exempt from tribal criminal jurisdiction
– a category of people which would include those employed by energy companies that seek to
exploit tribal lands for oil and gas, or other forms of natural resource development.
As a result of VAWA and the existing criminal jurisdictional scheme in Indian country,
companies engaged in natural resource development in Indian country could experience a couple
of changes related to criminal matters following the McGirt decision. First, any Indians
employed by such companies who are accused of crimes could find themselves subject to tribal
and/or federal criminal jurisdiction 124 subject to the limitations discussed above. Second,
because of VAWA, any non-Indians can fall under tribal criminal jurisdiction if they commit
domestic violence against spouses or dating partners who are citizens of the tribes. 125 It is
See Sari Horwitz, Dark Side of The Boom, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/09/28/dark-side-of-the-boom/?utm_term=.142685688eee; Aura
Bogado, Fracking, Tribal Lands, and The Bureau of Land Management: What Happens Next?, GRIST (Mar. 2,
2016), https://grist.org/climate-energy/fracking-tribal-lands-and-the-bureau-of-land-management-what-happensnext/.
121 See id.
122 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
123 127 Stat. 54 (2013).
124 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that tribes possess criminal jurisdiction over all Indians
regardless of whether or not the Indian is a citizen of the tribe at issue).
125 This is particularly relevant because many communities impacted by explosive natural resource development
have seen “man camps” (temporary communities of transient workers who tend to be overwhelmingly male) pop up
and instances of violence, including sexual assault and domestic violence increase. Kathleen Finn et al.,
Responsible Resource Development and Prevention of Sex Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women and Children
on the Fort Berthold Reservation, 40 HARVARD J. LAW GEND. 1, 2 (2017)( noting that “rapid oil and gas
development have brought an unprecedented rise of violent crime on and near the Fort Berthold reservation…
Specifically, the influx of well-paid male oil and gas workers, living in temporary housing often referred to as “man
camps,” has coincided with a disturbing increase in sex trafficking of Native women.”). See also REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ON HER MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12-13 (2017),
https://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/sr_on_indigenous_peoples_final_us_country_visit_report.p
df. (noting that “Rapid development of the Bakken Formation since 2011 has attracted thousands of oil workers to
North Dakota. One of the effects of the influx of oil and gas workers to the area has been a dramatic increase in
120
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therefore possible that entities engaged in natural resource development within the territories
affected by the Court’s McGirt decision could find that their employees will have greater
interactions with tribal and federal courts.
B. Environmental regulation
Having explained how the McGirt decision potentially impacts criminal jurisdiction within the
affected territories, it is helpful to now examine how the decision potentially impacts
environmental regulation, as natural resource development in Indian country typically is subject
to environmental regulation. As an initial starting point, tribes may enact laws as a result of their
inherent tribal sovereignty,126 and, unless a federal environmental regulation of general
application applies – tribes may enact their own tribal environmental regulations. Contact with
foreign sovereigns certainly influenced tribal governments.127 Despite this contact, however,
tribal governments retain the status of independent, sovereign governments. As the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged in Worcester v. Georgia, tribes are “distinct, independent
political communities.”128 Inherent tribal sovereignty persists today. “Tribal powers of selfgovernment are recognized by the Constitution, legislation, treaties, judicial decisions, and
administrative practice.”129 Unless federal law divests a tribe of its inherent sovereignty, the
tribe’s sovereignty remains intact. 130 Tribes maintain sovereign authority over their members
and territory to the extent not limited by federal law. 131
Nonetheless, the nature of tribal sovereignty has changed over time, largely as a result of tribes’
interactions with the federal government. Today, tribes maintain those aspects of sovereignty
that have not been removed by virtue of treaty, statute or “by implication as a necessary result of

violent crime, generally, and a notable increase in trafficking of Native women and children.”) The United States
Department of State has also acknowledged the problem, noting that “Service providers in areas near camps
surrounding large-scale oil extraction facilities, such as the Bakken oil fields in North Dakota in the United States,
have reported that sex traffickers have exploited women in the area, including Native American women.” UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE LINK BETWEEN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND SEX TRAFFICKING (2017),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272964.pdf.
126 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ch. 10 (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2012).
127 For example, the Anglo court systems of the federal government and state governments influenced the
development of tribal courts following first contact. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983).
128 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). The Worcester Court went on to explain that even though the Court had described
tribes as “domestic dependent nations” in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831), that tribal sovereignty
still existed and tribes were not dependent on federal law. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.01[1][a]
(Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds. Lexis Nexis 2005 ed.) (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559).
129 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 4.01[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2012).
130 Id.
131 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.01[1][b] (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2005) citing Worcester,
31 U.S. at 555 (absent tribal or federal approval “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have not force”); Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (affirming exclusive tribal authority to impose criminal punishment on tribal
members absent federal law to the contrary); Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (upholding exclusive tribal
jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding in which all parties were tribal members and reservation residents); 25
U.S.C. § 1911(a) (reinforcing the Fisher holding by declaring exclusive tribal jurisdiction over certain child custody
matters involving children who are tribal members or eligible to be tribal members, so long as the children are
domiciled or residing on the reservation, or wards of a tribal court).
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their dependent status.”132 Accordingly, any examination of tribal authority should start with the
presumption that the tribe in question possesses sovereignty, unless the tribe has been divested of
its sovereignty by the federal government.133
In addition to inherent tribal sovereignty, Congress may also delegate environmental federal
authority to tribes through either a treaty or statute.134 The ability of Congress to delegate
authority to tribes is especially important in the context of environmental regulatory law.
Because many federal environmental and energy laws are usually considered to be laws of
general application, they apply in Indian country, unless their application would directly interfere
with tribal sovereignty.135 As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
the authority to implement federal environmental laws in Indian country. 136 However, the EPA
has interpreted some federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, “not as
delegating or conferring federal power on tribes, but as authorizing tribes to implement federal
programs within the scope of their inherent [tribal] powers.”137 Conversely, under the Clean Air
Act, the EPA interprets the Act as a delegation of authority to tribes. 138 Therefore, under several
federal environmental statutes, tribes may choose to administer the federal environmental
programs and standards through tribes-as-states (TAS) mechanisms. 139 The TAS provisions of
major federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act,140 Clean Water Act,141 and Safe
Drinking Water Act, 142 allow tribes to act as states for purposes of implementing the statute
under the cooperative federalism scheme. 143 Accordingly, in situations where one of these
regulations may apply to natural resource development, the tribe could have a say in how the
regulation is applied within its territorial borders if it has TAS authority.
Jurisdictional uncertainty sometimes arises in relation to a tribe’s authority over the actions of
non-members and non-Indians acting within the tribe’s territory. This is relevant to natural
resource development, as it is not uncommon for the developer to be non-Indian acting on land
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.01[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2005).
134 Id. “Whether such statutes actually delegate federal power, as opposed to affirming or recognizing inherent
power, is a matter of congressional intent.” Id.
135 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (explaining that federal laws of general
application apply to Indian country); Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 10.01[2][a] (Nell Jessup Newton,
et al. eds., 2012). However, the application of federal environmental laws does not displace the ability of tribes to
enact environmental laws. Id. at § 10.01[2][b].
136 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 10.01[2][a] (Nell Jessup Newton, et al. eds., 2012).
137 Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (1991)). Moreover, tribal inherent sovereignty to enact environmental
laws is not displaced by federal environmental law. For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act states that nothing in
the Act’s 1977 Amendments “shall be construed to alter or affect the state of American Indian lands or water rights
nor to waive any sovereignty over Indian land guaranteed by treaty of statute.” 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(c)(1) (2012).
138 See, e.g., WAYNE NASTRI, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 9, ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATION FOR THE NAVAJO NATION FOR TREATMENT IN THE SAME MANNER AS A STATE FOR PURPOSES OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT TITLE V, 40 CFR PART 71 PROGRAM, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201507/documents/navajotas.pdf (last visited May 6, 2018).
139 JUDITH V. ROYSTER, MICHAEL C. BLUMM, & ELIZABETH ANN KRONK, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW 227 (3d ed. 2013).
140 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d)(2) (2012).
141 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012).
142 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1).
143 Id.
132
133
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owned by a non-Indian In the civil regulatory context, this is because tribes’ have been divested
of their inherent sovereignty over non-citizens unless certain conditions exist. 144 In Montana v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the extent of the Crow Nation’s inherent
sovereignty over non-Indians.145 Specifically, the Crow Nation wished to regulate the hunting
and fishing of non-Indians on non-Indian land located within the Nation’s territory. 146
Ultimately, because of implicit divestiture of the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, 147 the Court
determined that tribes do not have authority to regulate the hunting and fishing of non-Indians
owning fee land148 within the Crow Nation’s reservation boundaries. 149
However, despite the implicit divestiture of tribal inherent sovereignty over non-Indians on nonIndian fee land within reservation boundaries, the Court acknowledged that tribes may regulate
the activities of such individuals under two circumstances. First, tribes may regulate the
activities of individuals who have entered into “consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members.”150 Second, a tribe retains the “inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”151
Notably, the Montana decision involved the actions of non-Indians living on non-Indian owned
land within the Nation’s territory. It may therefore be argued that tribes have more authority to
regulate the activities of non-members and non-Indians on tribally-controlled land within the
tribe’s territory. However, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hicks casts
doubt on this assumption.152 In Hicks, the Court considered whether the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone
Tribes had jurisdiction over Mr. Hicks’ civil claim against Nevada game wardens in their
individual capacities. 153 Hicks, a tribal citizen, alleged that when searching his on-reservation
property, the Nevada game wardens violated certain tribal civil provisions (in addition to
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Tribes’ criminal jurisdiction is generally limited to Indians.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
145 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
146 Id,
147 Id. See also Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in
Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 353 (1994). “According to this theory, courts can rule that, in addition to
having lost certain aspects of their original sovereignty through the express language of treaties and acts of
Congress, tribes also may have been divested of aspects of sovereignty by implication of their dependent status.”
Kevin Gover & James B. Cooney, Cooperation Between Tribes and States in Protecting the Environment, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 35 (1996).
148 Since Montana, the Supreme Court has also considered the ability of tribe’s to regulate the conduct of nonmembers and non-Indians on other types of lands. For example, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997),
the Court held that the Indian tribe did not possess the inherent sovereignty to adjudicate a civil complaint arising
from an accident between two non-Indians on a state highway within the tribe’s reservation boundaries. The State
Court explained that “[a]s to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction.” 520 U.S. at 453.
149 Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65 (holding that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so
cannot survive without express congressional delegation….”).
150 Id. at 565.
151 Id. at 566.
152 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
153 Id.
144
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violating federal law). In concluding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
tribal-law based claims, the Court found that the Montana exceptions did not apply.154 It may
therefore be argued that the Court implicitly suggested in Hicks that Montana applied to the
actions of non-members and non-Indians within Indian country regardless of the status of land
where the activity occurred.
Based on the foregoing, the McGirt decision would impact civil environmental regulation within
the affected territory by applying the framework described above to natural resource
development. So, the affected Tribes would generally have regulatory jurisdiction over their
citizens within their territories, but not over non-citizens owning fee land within the same
territory.155 Because of their inherent sovereignty, tribes generally have regulatory authority
over their citizens within their physical territory. Tribes generally do not have inherent
sovereignty over and therefore lack jurisdiction over non-Indians acting on non-Indian land
within tribal territory,156 unless one of the two Montana exceptions applies. Tribes may have
regulatory authority in such circumstances if the non-Indians or non-members in question have
consented to tribal jurisdiction or if the non-Indian conduct “threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 157
However, through delegated authority, such as the TAS provisions of many federal
environmental statutes, tribes may have jurisdictional authority over non-members and nonIndians. Depending on the whether the affected Tribe has enacted tribal environmental laws and
on whether it has TAS under federal environmental laws,158 an entity engaged in natural resource
development within the affirmed tribal borders of the McGirt decision could find itself having
significantly more interaction with tribal environmental law and federal law that incorporates
tribal preferences through the TAS framework.
Interestingly, within two weeks of the Court’s decision in McGirt, the State of Oklahoma
petitioned the EPA to allow it to continue to regulate environmental programs across areas that
533 U.S. at 355–69, 374–75.
As support for this conclusion, the controversial Murphy/McGirt Agreement-in-Principle, discussed above,
certainly appeared to contemplate the application of the Montana presumption and its two exceptions.
Murphy/McGirt Agreement-in-Principle, 2, available at: http://www.oag.ok.gov/Websites/oag/images/doc%20%202020-07-15%20-%20murphy%20(final%20-%20agreement-in-principle).pdf (last accessed July 25, 2020)
(“Affirm the Five Tribes’ civil jurisdiction throughout their respective treaty territories, to be exercised subject to
Federal law that generally governs Tribal civil jurisdiction in Indian country. The Five Tribes would accordingly be
affirmed in their civil jurisdiction over, for example, matters of self-government and their members but would
remain subject to the Federal law that provides, as a general matter, that Tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over
non-members outside Indian trust or restricted lands, as described above, except for (1) subject matters for which
Federal law specifically grants Tribes jurisdiction; (2) activities of non-members that are part of a consensual
relationship, such as contracts, with the Tribe; or (3) conduct of non-members that threatens Tribal self-governance
or the economic security, health, or welfare of the Tribe.”).
156 Although Montana involved the activities of non-Indians on non-Indian fee land suggesting that the status of the
land plays a role in the determination of jurisdiction, Nevada v. Hicks muddies the analysis of tribal jurisdiction.
This is because the Hicks Court applied the Montana exceptions to a situation where the alleged wrongful activity
occurred on property owned by a tribal member.
157 Id.
158 See Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmental Law, 39 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law
42 (2014) (discussing tribal environmental laws applicable in Oklahoma); Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Tribes as
Innovative Environmental “Laboratories”, 86 University of Colorado Law Review 789 (2015) (discussing tribal
innovations under the TAS framework).
154
155
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were Indian Territory prior to Oklahoma becoming a state. 159 Typically, states do not have the
ability to engage in environmental regulation within Indian country, as either the EPA or the
Tribes through TAS status will engage in such regulation. 160 However, under the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA) of 2005, the EPA does
have the authority to grant Oklahoma’s request. 161 If EPA should grant Oklahoma’s request,
Oklahoma’s environmental regulations would continue to govern the affected territory, although
tribal environmental laws could still apply where they are not pre-empted by the federal
environmental statutes.
C. Taxation
As mentioned above, the McGirt decision will unlikely affect taxes based on land
ownership/status.162 However, there could be some impacts to the taxes applied to natural
resource development within Indian country. It is therefore helpful to briefly review the existing
taxation scheme in place. A long-standing rule of construction of tax laws provides that "to be
valid, exemptions to tax laws should be clearly expressed."163 In some cases, Indian interests
have been expressly exempted from general tax laws.164 In other cases, as in Squire, the courts
have been willing to find congressional intent to exempt Indian interests from taxation where the
exemption is not express.165
Under the test articulated in Squire, income which is derived directly from allotments held in
trust is not subject to federal taxation. "Income is derived directly if is generated principally from
the use of reservation land and resources. It is not derived directly if was earned primarily
through a combination of taxpayer labor, the sale of goods produced off the reservation, and
improvements constructed on the trust land."166 Income is not directly derived if it is attributable
primarily to use of the capital improvements constructed on the land and the individual's
management of those assets or business activities related to those assets. 167 Using these or similar
formulations of the "derived directly" prong, courts have held that income which allottees earned
from bonuses and royalties on minerals, from the rental or sale of crops, or from the sale or

Jack Money, Oklahoma seeks continued authority to oversee environmental programs in state's Indian
territories, The Oklahoman (July 24, 2020), available at: https://oklahoman.com/article/5667451/oklahoma-seekscontinued-authority-to-oversee-environmental-programs-in-states-indian-territories.
160 EPA, Direct Implementation in Indian Country, available at: https://www.epa.gov/tribal/direct-implementationindian-country (last accessed July 29, 2020); State of Washington, Department of Ecology v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that EPA’s determination that state
environmental regulations do not apply within Indian country was reasonable).
161 Pub. L. 109-59.
162 Grant D. Crawford, Former tribal justice, law school dean says Supreme Court's McGirt ruling has no affect on
property ownership, taxation, CNHI LLC (July 18, 2020), https://www.cnhi.com/featured_stories/former-tribaljustice-law-school-dean-says-supreme-courts-mcgirt-ruling-has-no-affect-on/article_69a44cd6-c9be-11ea-ae3af753c26e583b.html.
163 Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956).
164 Id.
165 See generally Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
166 Dillon v. United States, 792 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986).
167 Critzer v. United States, 597 F.2d 708 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
159
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exchange of livestock, is tax exempt. 168 As a result of these decisions, for a tribal member who
is engaging in natural resource development on their allotment, they will be exempt from federal
taxes, but such exception would have likely existed prior to the McGirt decision at the Indian
would have been doing such development on their allotment.
In terms of tribal taxation, tribes generally maintain the authority to tax their tribal members. In
terms of taxation, the controversies are more likely to come up in the context of tribes attempting
to tax non-Indian entities doing business within their territories. This was exactly the issue in
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.169 In Merrion, 21 lessees of tribal lands, who were engaged
in natural resource development (primarily oil and gas developed), sued to challenge the Tribe’s
application of a severance tax on “any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from
Tribal lands."170 Following the revision of the Tribe’s constitution, the Tribe sought to apply the
severance tax against the lessees that were already engaged in development on the reservation. 171
The Court ultimately held that the Tribe could apply the severance tax, explaining that:
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980) (Colville), we addressed the Indian tribes' authority to impose taxes on nonIndians doing business on the reservation. We held that "[the] power to tax
transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its
members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status."
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a
necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power
enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential services. The power
does not derive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from
tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to
control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing
governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises
engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction.
The petitioners avail themselves of the "substantial privilege of carrying on
business" on the reservation. They benefit from the provision of police protection
and other governmental services, as well as from "‘the advantages of a civilized
society'" that are assured by the existence of tribal government. Numerous other
governmental entities levy a general revenue tax similar to that imposed by the
Jicarilla Tribe when they provide comparable services. Under these circumstances,
there is nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners to contribute through taxes to
the general cost of tribal government. 172

Big Eagle v. United States, 300 F.2d 765 (Ct. Cl. 1962); United States v. Daney, 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966);
Rev. Rul. 62-16, 1962-1 C.B. 7.
169 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
168

Id.
Id.
172 Id.
170
171
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As a result of the Merrion decision,173 it is highly likely that the Tribes affected by the McGirt
decision could enact a severance tax against any lessees engaged in natural resource
development within the recently affirmed reservation borders of the Tribes. Imposition of a
severance tax, however, would be likely limited to land that is held in trust status. 174 As a result,
costs related to taxation could increase for natural resource development entities, should Tribes
decide to apply severance taxes as the Tribe did in Merrion. Interestingly, a Tribe’s application
of a severance tax does not preclude the state from also taxing a non-tribal entity doing work
within Indian country.175 As a result, a natural resource development entity doing work on tribal
trust land within a tribe’s reservation could potentially find itself taxed by both the tribe and the
state.
D. Oil and Gas leasing
The federal government plays a significant role related to energy development within Indian
country. As indicated above, federal regulatory statutes tend to be statutes of general
applicability, and, therefore, several federal statutes directly apply to such development,
including the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 176 Indian Mineral Development Act, 177 Energy Policy
Act of 2005,178 Rights of Way Act,179 and Long-Term Leasing Act,180 to name a few. Under the
Indian Mineral Leasing and Indian Mineral Development Acts, the Secretary of the Interior is
required to approve all oil, gas, and geothermal leases.181 Leases for renewable energy projects
must typically be approved under the Long-Term Leasing Act.182 Further, if transmission lines
or pipelines are included in the project, then the Secretary must approve the rights-of-way for
After the Merrion decision, some argued that the reason the Court held the way it did is because the Secretary of
the Interior approved the Tribe’s constitutional revision, and, therefore, implicitly approved the taxation. The
argument, therefore, was that this was a federal delegation to the Tribe and not truly a vestige of tribal sovereignty.
However, this argument was rejected by the Court in its decision in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 195 (1985). In Kerr-McGee Corp., the Court was presented with facts very similar to those in Merrion,
but there was an important factual difference because the Secretary of the Interior did not approve the Tribe’s
constitutional revision (there was no requirement for such approval in the prior constitution). Despite this factual
different, the Court still determined that the Tribe had the right to apply the taxes. Id.
173

Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (rejecting the ability of the Navajo Nation to require a
hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the borders of the Reservation to collect a hotel occupancy tax).
175 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). Notably, however, post-Cotton Petroleum cases in
the lower federal courts have found state taxes on non-Indians doing business within Indian country preempted where
there is a comprehensive federal scheme that leaves no room for state regulation or services. See Quinault Indian
Nation v. Grays Harbor County, 19 Indian. L. Rep. 3176 (W.D. Wash. 1989) [1992] (state compensating tax on the
sale of forest lands to a tax-exempt entity preempted). See also Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 967 F.2d
1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing trial court's dismissal of tribe's suit to enjoin state transaction privilege tax on ticket
revenues); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994) (state tax on off-track betting
activities on tribal lands preempted by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). Although these lower court cases have
adhered to the traditional preemption analysis, none of them has involved state taxation of mineral lessees.
174

25 U.S.C. § 398 (2012).
25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–08.
178 25 U.S.C. §§ 3502 et seq.
179 25 U.S.C. §§ 311–28.
180 25 U.S.C. § 415.
181 25 U.S.C. §§ 398, 2103.
182 25 U.S.C. § 415(a).
176
177
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those projects.183 Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the HEARTH Act, if tribes have the
necessary agreement in place, they may approve certain agreements related to energy
development.184 However, for a variety of reasons, few tribes have taken advantage of these
provisions.185 Finally, the federal government regulates energy services within Indian country
under the Federal Power Act, 186 the Public Utility Regulatory Practices Act,187 and the Natural
Gas Act.188 Under the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has the sole
jurisdiction to approve the siting, permitting, and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines.
In addition to these statutes specific to energy, federal environmental statutes also impact the
development of energy resources within Indian country. It is therefore notable that several
federal environmental statutes also apply to Indian country, as statutes of general applicability.
Relevant federal environmental statutes include: the National Environmental Policy Act, 189
National Historic Preservation Act, 190 Clean Water Act,191 Clean Air Act,192 and Endangered
Species Act.193
E. Rights of Way
Rights-of-way through reservations, such as railroads and state highways, are trust land. (Rightsof-way are discussed in Chapter V, section A.3.) Consequently, the Ninth Circuit upheld a Tribe's
right to impose a tax on a railroad's possessory interests within the reservation. Burlington
Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1991). Six years later,
however, the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of tribal jurisdiction over state highways,
rights-of-way were the equivalent of fee land:
Forming part of the State's highway, the right-of-way is open to the public, and traffic on
it is subject to the State's control. The Tribes have consented to, and received payment for,
the State's use of the 6.59-mile stretch for a public highway. They have retained no
gatekeeping right. So long as the stretch is maintained as part of the State's highway, the
Tribes cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude. We therefore align the
right-of-way, for the purpose at hand, with land alienated to non-Indians.194
Based on Strate, the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled Burlington Northern. Big Horn County
Electric Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000). The Crow Tribe enacted a Railroad and
25 U.S.C. § 321, 323.
25 U.S.C. §§ 3504, 415(h).
185 Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy Development Under the HEARTH Act: An
Independently Rational, but Collectively Deficient, Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Elizabeth Ann Kronk,
Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Unintended “Great Mischief for Indian Energy Development” and the
Resulting Need for Reform, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811 (2012).
186 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (2012).
187 16 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
188 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq.
189 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
190 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.
191 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
192 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
193 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
194 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
183
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Utility Tax Code, assessing a three percent tax on the full fair market value of utility property
located on tribal or trust lands within the Crow Reservation. The utility objected, claiming that the
tribe had no authority to tax its property because the property was located on a congressionally
granted right-of-way, the equivalent under Strate of fee land. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Strate
governed, even though the tribe argued that the utility's rights-of-way were neither open to the
public nor under the control of the state.
Applying the Montana tests for tribal authority over nonmembers on fee lands, the court held that
neither exception permitted a tribal tax on utility property located on tribal trust lands. The court
dismissed the first exception, even though the utility had a consensual relationship with the tribe.
Under that exception, the court determined that a tribe could tax the activities of nonmembers, but
not the value of property owned by nonmembers. In addition, the court determined that the second
"direct effects" exception from Montana did not apply because the tax was not necessary to protect
tribal self-government or control internal relations.
In Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit held that: "The Tribes' power to tax nonmembers derives
from the Tribes' continuing property interest. Like the continuing property interest in the leases at
issue in Merrion [citation omitted], this interest was not extinguished by the right-of-way grant."
F. Other Future Implications of McGirt
Great nations, like great men, should keep their word. – Federal Power Commission v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (Black, J., dissenting)
My ancestor … who signed the treaty … accepted the word of the United States – that this treaty
would protect not only the Indian way of life for those then living, but also for all generations yet
unborn. – Jerry Meninick, Citizen of the Yakama Nation 195
More broadly than natural resource development in Indian country, the McGirt decision possibly
signals another important implication moving forward – the strength of legal claims based on
tribal treaty rights. As explained above, the McGirt decision affirms the Reservation boundaries
established in the treaties at issue.196 And, Justice Gorsuch affirms the importance of honoring
treaties, unless explicitly abrogated by Congress, in his opinion. 197
Tribes have often turned to their treaties with the United States as a way of protecting valuable
rights. For example, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community successfully asserted its treaty
rights to fish, a cultural “keystone” for the Tribe, in the 1970s.198 Historically, federal courts
have interpreted treaties in expansive and progressive ways given the time of such decisions. For
example, in 1908, the United States Supreme Court determined that tribal treaties, which made
no explicit mention, of water rights reserved water rights sufficient for the primary purposes of a
Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims
of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 355, 356 (2003) (citation omitted).
196 [INSERT SUPRA NOTE]
197 [INSERT]
198 SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY, SWINOMISH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE CLIMATE ADAPTATION
ACTION PLAN 10 (October 2010), available at:
http://www.swinomish.org/climate_change/Docs/SITC_CC_AdaptationActionPlan_complete.pdf.
195

27

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680658

reservation.199 Similarly, in 1974, the Western District of Washington district court determined
that tribal treaties provided for a reserved right of tribes to be co-managers of fisheries along
with the states, despite the fact that the treaties involved did not explicitly reference such a right
to co-management.200 While these decisions are well-established and respected today, they were
groundbreaking and novel in their time. These decisions and others demonstrate the capacity for
federal courts to interpret treaties in broad ways in order to protect tribal resources. Moreover,
such decisions also demonstrate federal courts’ willingness to demand specific action from the
federal government on the basis of implicit treaty provisions.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions support this historical trend of upholding treaty provisions.
Notably, since Justice Gorsuch joined the Court in 2017, the Court has upheld tribal treaty rights
in three cases (the third being the McGirt decision). Prior to the Court’s decision in McGirt, the
Court upheld tribal treaty rights in three recent cases (since Justice Gorsuch joined the Court):
Washington v. United States, Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.,
and Herrara v. Wyoming.
In Washington v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a single sentence opinion stating
that “[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.” 201 At issue in this case was the
interpretation of treaties entered into between tribes and the federal government in the 19th
Century. In 1854 and 1855, Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest entered into a series of
treaties, now known as the "Stevens Treaties," negotiated by Isaac I. Stevens, Superintendent of
Indian Affairs and Governor of Washington Territory. Under the Stevens Treaties ("Treaties") at
issue in this case, the tribes relinquished large swaths of land. In exchange for their land, the
tribes were guaranteed a right to off-reservation fishing.
The Tribes contend that Washington State had violated, and was continuing to violate, the
Treaties by building and maintaining culverts that prevented mature salmon from returning from
the sea to their spawning grounds; prevented smolt (juvenile salmon) from moving downstream
and out to sea; and prevented very young salmon from moving freely to seek food and escape
predators. In 2007, the district court held that in building and maintaining these culverts
Washington had caused the size of salmon runs in the Case Area to diminish and that
Washington thereby violated its obligation under the Treaties. In 2013, the court issued an
injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The equally divided Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision
finding that culverts infringed on the Tribes’ treaty right to take fish at usual and accustomed
places. Further, the State of Washington also appealed the lower court’s decision dismissing
Washington’s equitable claims that the federal government told the State to design culverts a
certain way and then brought suit challenging the culverts. Finally, the State of Washington had
also appealed to challenge the issuance of an injunction that allegedly violated federalism and
comity principles. Given the equally divided Court, the State of Washington’s arguments on
these two points failed.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564.
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
201 138 S.Ct. 1832 (2018).
199
200
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In Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., Cougar Den, Inc. – a
wholesale fuel importer, owned by a citizen of the Yakama Nation and incorporated under
Yakama law, challenged the application of taxes by the Washington State Department of
Licensing. The State of Washington assessed Cougar Den a total of $3.6 million in taxes,
penalties, and licensing fees for failure to pay taxes on fuel it imported into the State of
Washington on its way for sale on the Yakama Nation. The Court ultimately determined that
application of the State’s taxes and fees was not appropriate given the Yakama Nation’s treaty
right to travel upon all public highways in common with citizens of the United States.
Cougar Den is a wholesale fuel importer owned by a member of the Yakama Nation. Cougar
Den imports fuel from Oregon over Washington’s public highways to the Yakama Reservation.
The Washington State Department assessed Cougar Den $3.6 million in taxes and fees for
importing the fuel into Washington. Cougar Dean appealed stating that the tax was pre-empted
by an 1855 treaty which reserved the “right, in common with citizens of the US to travel upon all
public highways.” The Washington Supreme Court held the tax was pre-empted by the treaty.
In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, the
Court determined that the 1855 treaty between the Yakama Nation and the federal government
pre-empted that application of the State of Washington’s fuel tax to Cougar Den. In reaching
this decision, the Court explained that it had previously interpreted language similar to the one at
issue in this treaty, and, in every instance, “has stressed that the language of the treaty should be
understood as bearing the meaning that the Yakamas understood it to have.” Further, the Court
explained that treaty terms should be read in the terms that the Tribe would have understood
them, that the right to travel included the right to travel with goods for sale, and that taxes would
burden this right to travel.
Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. In agreeing that
the taxes did not apply, Justice Gorsuch explained that, when interpreting a treaty, the treaty
should be interpreted as the tribe would have understood it at the time. Here, there was evidence
in the record to support that the Yakama Nation would have understood the treaty provision as
the right to travel far distances for the purpose of trade. The State of Washington argued that the
provision meant that the Nation could use highways the same as other citizens of the State, but
Justice Gorsuch explained that “the consideration the Yakamas supplied – millions of acres
desperately wanted by the United States to settle the Washington territory – was worth far more
than an abject promise they would not be made prisoners on their reservation.” Id. at *2.
Finally, in a paragraph that has already been readily quoted by those working in Indian country,
Justice Gorsuch explained:
Really, this case just tells an old and familiar story. The State of Washington
includes millions of acres that the Yakamas ceded to the United States under
significant pressure. In return, the government supplied a handful of modest
promises. The state is now dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those
promises. It is a new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its credit, the
Court holds the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do.
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In Herrera v. Wyoming,202 a Crow tribal member appealed his state law conviction for hunting in
Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest. As Justice Sotomayor, writing for the five justice majority,
explained:
The case [Race Horse] established that the crucial inquiry for treaty termination
analysis is whether Congress has expressly abrogated an Indian treaty right or
whether a termination point identified in the treaty itself has been satisfied.
Statehood is irrelevant to this analysis unless a statehood Act otherwise
demonstrates Congress' clear intent to abrogate a treaty, or statehood appears as a
termination point in the treaty. …
Accordingly, the majority wrote, “[Herrera] is not a hard case,” and the rights reserved by the
Crow Tribe in the 1868 Treaty were not abrogated by Wyoming’s statehood. 203 The Court in
Herrera therefore rejected arguments similar to those made in McGirt – that the admission of a
state to the Union somehow abrogated a tribe’s treaty rights.
Given tribes relatively “low” success rate in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, 204 it is remarkable
that claims based on tribal treaties have been successful in all four of the recent cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court. And, in all of these cases, Justice Gorsuch has been in the majority.
These two trends suggest that claims based on tribal treaty rights continue to be relatively strong
claims in the federal courts, and it also suggests Justice Gorsuch may be sympathetic to these
types of claims. In terms of future implications, it is therefore likely that individual Indians and
tribal parties will likely attempt to avail themselves of claims based on treaty rights, and this will
likely be true in the natural resource development realm as well as other types of claims.
V.

Conclusion

Tribes have significant natural resources at their disposal. The McGirt decision has the potential
to further promote Tribes as a key player in energy development in the United States. While there
is always the possibility that courts will interpret the McGirt decision to only apply to the Major
Crimes Act and criminal jurisdiction, Justice Gorsuch never explicitly limits the decision in this
way. Moreover, the definition of “Indian Country” in Indian criminal law has historically been
used in numerous other contexts, including civil regulatory areas. In Atkinson Trading Company,
however, the Court found the Ninth Circuit's reliance on that statute "misplaced," noting that §
1151 is "a statute conferring upon Indian tribes jurisdiction over certain criminal acts." The Court
explained:
Although § 1151 has been relied upon to demarcate state, federal, and tribal
jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters, we do not here deal with a claim of
statutorily conferred power. Section 1151 simply does not address an Indian tribe's
inherent or retained sovereignty over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land.205
139 S.Ct. 1686 (2019),
Id. at 1700.
204 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/580.
205 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
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Further, in his opinion, Justice Gorsuch tees up some legal arguments, such as procedural
bars, res judicata, statutes of repose, and laches, as potential arguments to be used to curb
a widespread upending of federal Indian law as a result of the McGirt decision.206
Federal courts may end up accepting such arguments as limits on the Court’s decision.
Ultimately, the full implications of McGirt will take time to be revealed, but Tribes and
their interests will not easily be overlooked. “Far from being relics of a bygone era,
Indian tribal powers bear the fine burnish of everyday use.”207
“But it is unclear why pessimism should rule the day.”

206
207

McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. _____, 41-42 (2020).
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 940 (D. Utah 2005).
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